Small-Scale Terrorist Attacks Using Chemical and Biological Agents: An Assessment Framework and Preliminary Comparisons

By Shea, Dana A.

Book Id: WPLBN0000235064
Format Type: PDF eBook
File Size: 0.8 MB
Reproduction Date: 2008

Title:	Small-Scale Terrorist Attacks Using Chemical and Biological Agents: An Assessment Framework and Preliminary Comparisons
Author:	Shea, Dana A.
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Government publications, Legislation., Government Printing Office (U.S.)
Collections:	Government Library Collection
Historic Publication Date:
Publisher:	Government Printing Office


Citation APA MLA Chicago Shea, D. A. (n.d.). Small-Scale Terrorist Attacks Using Chemical and Biological Agents: An Assessment Framework and Preliminary Comparisons. Retrieved from http://www.gutenberg.us/

Excerpt
Excerpt: Public concern about the nation’s vulnerability to chemical and biological (C/B) terrorism was amplified by the consequences of the anthrax mailings that sickened 22 people and killed 5 between September and November, 2001. Subsequent C/B terrorism events, such as the Ricin mailings to the White House in 2003 and to the Senate in 2004, have served to highlight the potential for future terrorist attacks using C/B agents. C/B weapons, previously considered to be of interest mainly to military planners, are now a topic of public and congressional interest. Compared with most conventional weapons, C/B weapons are less well understood and have the potential to cause mass casualties. Even if used in smaller attacks, C/B weapons have the potential to cause mass terror. Potential effects of a C/B terrorist event vary widely, depending on the agent used, the effectiveness of its dissemination, the target struck, and the public reaction to the event.

Table of Contents
Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Definition of C/B Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Probability of a C/B Weapon Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Historical Acquisition and Use of C/B Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 C/B Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Assessments by Government Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Military-use Assessment Compared to Terrorist-use Assessment . . . . 10 How Difficult Is it to Develop C/B Agents for Terrorist Use? . . . . . . 11 Agent Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Chemical Agent Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Choice of Chemical Agents Assessed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Biological Agent Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Choice of Biological Agents Assessed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Toxin Agents Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Choice of Toxin Agents Assessed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Potential Uses of Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Deviations From Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Terrorist Motivation-Specific Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Potential for Covert Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Range of Lethality and Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Contagious Dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Previous Use of C/B Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Source of C/B Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 From a Manufacturing Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 From a Natural Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 From a Culture Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Manufacture and Preparation of C/B Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Current Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 International Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Domestic Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Dual-Use Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 New Multinational Regulation Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Prevention Vers